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Leidschrift, jaargang 27, nummer 1, april 2012 
A veritable research tradition, ranging back right to contemporaries of 
seventeenth century events, has recognized a curious intensification of civil 
wars and internal conflicts in Europe’s monarchies during the 1620s to 
1650s. Among the most prominent are the Thirty Years’ War raging within 
the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, entangled with the war 
between France and Spain between 1635 and 1659, the attempts at 
secession from the Catholic Monarchy in Madrid by Portugal, Naples and 
Catalonia (1640-1647), the French Fronde (1648-1652), and the British Wars 
of Religion, raging in Scotland, Ireland and England (from the rebellion in 
Ireland in late 1641 to the Civil Wars of 1642-1648 and the subsequent 
capture of Scotland by Cromwell and the War in Ireland). All these conflicts 
did not only deliver considerable bloodshed and misery, they seemed to be 
made of an uneasy mixture of dynastic rivalry, confessional hostility and 
unprecedented societal conflict between princes and their elites. Deploring 
the miseries of war, though in itself a Christian genre, became particularly 
topical. Still immediately prior to the outbreak of civil war in the British 
Isles, pamphlets in England deplored Germany’s fate and begged readers to 
consider that whatever the conflicts within England or within the Stuart 
Dynastic agglomerate, civil war had to be avoided at all cost – to no avail.1 
                                                     
* The following paper was commissioned by the Leidschrift foundation and has, 
given its scope and the number of pages, a fairly general character. Footnotes are 
kept to the minimum. However, readers are advised to consult R. von Friedeburg, 
Europa in der frühen Neuzeit. Fischer Weltgeschichte, Neue Folge (Frankfurt 2012); R. von 
Friedeburg ed., Murder and Monarchy. Regicide in European History, 1300-1800 
(Houndsmill 2004); R. von Friedeburg, ‘Response to Introduction: ‘Ideology’, 
Factions and Foreign Politics in Early Modern Europe’ in: G. Rommelse and D. 
Onnekink ed., Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650-1750) (Aldershot 
2011) 11-28; R. von Friedeburg, State Forms and State Systems in Modern Europe, 
in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European 
History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/friedeburgr-2010-
en. I also thank Professor Dick de Boer and his colleagues within the ESF financed 
research group on European Regions for comments and criticism on an evening 




And once war seemed to have cooled down in Germany and the British 
Isles, the French Fronde seemed to throw France into chaos.  
In the following section I a short historiographic survey will attempt 
to review how historians have attempted to make sense of this turmoil. It is 
only after briefly reviewing the significant findings of these generations of 
historians, but also of the problematic influence of sociology on later stages 
of research, that the usefulness (or lack thereof) of a new research initiative 
can be gauged, that on the ‘New Monarchy’. This concept will be outlined 




   
The period from the later 1650s up to the 1680s is often regarded as the 
heyday of theories of monarchical absolutism; of the reception of Hobbes, 
of the introduction of the personal rule of Louis XIV in France and of 
absolutism in Denmark, of the establishment of territorial princely 
monarchies in Germany and of the re-establishment of the Stuart monarchy 
under Charles II in England, Scotland and Ireland. It is difficult to dispute 
that in this period political mobilization against the crown for religious 
reasons was increasingly identified with ‘phanaticism’. Writers who had – 
for whatever reasons – argued the feasibility of resistance against a 
legitimate prince were seen as being partly responsible for seducing hapless 
subjects into rebellions leading only to misery and bloodshed.2 From the 
later seventeenth century, from Pufendorf to Bayle, the blame for the mid-
seventeenth century bloodshed was increasingly less laid on unruly subjects 
or nobilities as such, but instead on the allegedly detrimental effects of 
                                                                                                                       
lecture I had the pleasure to give in Groningen and on which some of the 
arguments in this article are based. 
1 See for example R. Asch, Thirty Years War (New York 1997). For the reception of 
the bloodshed in Germany and the alleged lessons to preserve peace drawn from 
that see, for example, R. von Friedeburg, ‘The Continental Counter-Reformation 
and the Plausibility of the Popish Plots, 1638-1642’ in: G. Burgess and C. W. A. 
Prior ed., England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited (Aldershot 2011) 49-74.  
2 A good example is given in C. Jackson, ‘Buchanan in Hell’ in: C. Erskine and R. 
Mason ed., George Buchanan: Political Thought in Early Modern Britain and Europe 
(Aldershot 2012). Though Buchanan was not at all a zealous Calvinist, his 
publications were, long after he died, seen in the context of illicit mobilization and  
inciting the people into sedition that led, eventually, to terrible disaster.  




confessional propaganda of clergy inciting subjects and raising them against 
each other, and on authorities exploiting religious differences.3 
Post World War II scholarship has undergone a whole range of 
transformation of arguments, each delivering important points of view that 
should not be ignored. A number of arguments formulated in relation to 
the ‘Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’ debate argued around the clash of 
courtiers with regional and local elites. These courtiers had received offices 
from their princes financed by rising taxes. And they clashed with country 
and local elites, who were troubled by these very taxes and war-related 
burdens.4 The Reformation and religious conflicts did play a role in this 
argument, but the major thrust was the accumulation of offices, linked to 
rights to resources, the profits of courtiers, and the revulsion of local 
taxpayers against these burdens. A good deal of French, German and 
English pamphlet propaganda undoubtedly pointed in this direction. 
The intensification of social historical research in the wake of the 
expansion of Europe’s university systems uncovered in more detail the 
social affiliation and political attitudes of Europe’s wider elites. It appeared, 
in particular with respect to England, that there was hardly a clear cut 
country-court dichotomy that put a given gentry family − according to its 
income and resources − on either side of the court-country divide. Families 
tried to mobilize all sorts of sources of income; royal offices and 
commissions played an increasing and important part.5 Indeed, even some 
of the most outspoken critics of the duke of Buckingham and his friends 
had earlier been clients of Buckingham but had been simply disappointed in 
their quest for office and patronage. Richelieu and Mazarin in France, 
though attacked viciously from time to time for building their own 
clientage-networks, built them with the support and help of the French 
nobility, in the capital and the provinces. 6  Though the rhetoric of 
corruption and of evil courtiers was real enough, it did not reflect a real 
                                                     
3 See for example the argument of P. Bayle in his article in the Dictionnaire on 
‘Macon’, edited and commented in: S. Jenkinson, Bayle. Political Writings (Cambridge 
2000) 172-180. 
4 See H. T. Roper, The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (New York 1999), summoning 
articles published between 1956 and 1967; G. Parker and L. M. Smith ed., The 
General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London 1997).  
5 See J. Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (London 1993). 
6 See for example J. Collins, Classes, Estates and Order in Early-Modern Brittany 
(Cambridge 2003). 




social division of clear cut social groups, some profiting from princely 
offices and the administration of taxes, others not. For these new kinds of 
income were pursued by most and eschewed by few. 
Research has also pointed out the very real changes in the size and 
composition of armies, their huge increase in numbers – more then tenfold 
in the case of France between the 1490s and 1690s – and in the number of 
months these troops were held together, until eventually standing armies 
appeared. Also, the very real dynamic in the military competition among 
princes and dynasties has been recognized. It forced any dynasty that 
wanted to stay independent and play a role on the wider European stage to 
eventually mobilize substantial forces to take part in that competition. The 
history of Sweden and Denmark tells about the enormous consequences 
not least for smaller kingdoms in trying to raise these resources. But also for 
larger kingdoms and dynastic agglomerates, as for France and the Spanish 
Habsburgs, these challenges posed enormous problems. Nicholas Canny 
and others have stressed that the conquest of middle and southern America 
by the Catholic monarchy in Madrid and the enormous extra resources 
coming about for this monarchy have to be taken into account in explaining 
the substantial and momentous increase in the scale of warfare from the late 
fifteenth century onwards, since the consequences of this rapid change 
‘spilled over’ to other monarchies. They had, in particular, consequences for 
the Valois who had – almost unwittingly – taken on the emerging new 
monarchy of Spain in Italy and then became involved in two centuries of 
warfare against it.7 The burdens associated with this clash did not only put 
considerable stress on both the Catholic monarchy in Madrid and the 
French monarchy. Towards the end of the Thirty Years’ War both reckoned 
with rebellions breaking out in each other’s backyard – such as the Fronde 
and the break away or attempted break away of Portugal, Catalonia and 
Naples – and both Madrid and Paris hoped that such rebellions would 
weaken primarily the enemy, if one only held out that one more year or two. 
That is, already contemporary reflections on the dynamics of war and 
                                                     
7 G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (London 1976); G. Parker, The 
Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (Cambridge 1988); A. 
Ayton and J. L. Prince ed., The Medieval Military Revolution. State, Society and Military 
Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (London 1998), with essays covering the 
more recent debate; R. Frost, The Northern Wars (London 2000); L. Bely, La Societe 
des Princes (Paris 1999); N. Canny ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World 
(Oxford 2011). 




princely competition reckoned with the overspill of it on ‘domestic’ 
relations and even gambled on it.    
These insights have stood the test of time, but some of the more 
theoretical reflections based on them have not. To my mind, one of the 
most important casualties of the increasing empirical research of the last 
fifty years is the attempt to link these changes with the making of the 
modern state. Sociologists from Max Weber to Charles Tilly shifted 
emphasis from issues of legitimacy in explaining the nature of public order 
in the Latin West and instead focused on the organization of power, in 
particular of power organized in bureaucracies with their own written rules 
and standards of procedure. The armies and administrations that did 
develop during the later Middle Ages and throughout the early modern 
period became examples of such bureaucracies, i.e. of ‘early modern state 
building’. Thus, the clashes of the seventeenth century, their religious 
motivation notwithstanding, occurred in a process where the early modern 
state gradually overwhelmed local and regional elites to establish a 
monopoly of coercive power.8   
The last fifty years have seen a gradual disintegration of this view on 
various counts,9 the most important being considerations on constitutional 
                                                     
8 The traditional theory of state-building was devised towards the later nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century by the emerging discipline of sociology, 
primarily by Max Weber, but historians such as Otto Hintze and Gustav von 
Schmoller, also a major representative of the younger school of national economy, 
interested in economics and sociology, also had a large part in it. See on the 
problems associated with this: S. Breuer, ‘Das Legitimitätskonzept Max Webers’ in: 
D. Willoweit ed., Die Begründung des Rechts als historisches Problem (München 2000) 1-16; 
C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge 1990). Also 
see footnote 15 further below. Outside Germany, the term ‘state’ came into use by 
historians much later. The empirically quite good Cambridge Modern History: II 
Reformation (1944), III Wars of Religion (1934), and V Age of Louis XIV (1934), 
mentions ‘states’ only as ‘states-general’, in France or the Netherlands. I suppose 
that the influence of ‘state’ as sociological concept first became relevant in 
Germany for specific, German reasons, and then only after World War II invaded 
other historiographies in the wake of the claim of sociology to be a master 
discipline. In England, the influence of Geoffrey Elton was considerable, and he 
clearly had continental roots.   
9 For early criticism of the actual reach of absolutism within society, see the debates 
at the 1955 conference in Rome: C. Nolte, Konferenzreport: ‘The X Congresso 




and legal history, issues in financial history and considerations of the role of 
‘opinion’ and legitimacy among elites. 
 
 
One: Heterogeneity of provinces within any one monarchy and legal-
political arrangements within them  
 
The problem of the plurality of lands, customs, laws and societies within the 
dynastic agglomerate has been increasingly taken serious by researchers. 
Right until the end of the Napoleonic wars, regimes were hardly 
constructed or even understood as the legal person of a single ‘state’. The 
Habsburg agglomerate in German, Italian and Spanish lands, the Valois 
takeover of Burgundy and Brittany and the Stuart rule in England, Scotland 
and Ireland are examples of the early modern dynastic agglomerate. A 
dynasty held lands, massively differing among each other in almost every 
respect, and held them according to very different legal relations depending 
on each individual province. Even insofar as institutions of public order 
operated across these different provinces – courts of law, tax-offices – they 
remained mainly responsible only within any single principality, kingdom or 
province, while the interaction of politics and elites among these composite 
units and the management of this interaction by the reigning dynasty 
appeared to be a major crux of early modern politics.10  
                                                                                                                       
Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, Rom’. Organized by the German Historical Institute, Rome, 
and others (Rome 2005). 
10 Over the last twenty years, reflections on this fact have clearly increased: J. Elliot,  
‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, Past and Present 137 (1992) 48-71; R. Bonney, 
The European Dynastic States 1494-1660 (Oxford 1991) 524; J. Morrill, Uneasy lies the 
head that wears a crown. Dynastic crises in Tudor and Stuart Britain 1504-1746 (Reading 
2005) 11; L. Bely, La societé des princes (Paris 1999). A prime example of empirical 
research informed by this assumption is J. Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the 
Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim (Dublin 
1993). It needs to be said, however, that specifically leading in this field is perhaps 
Spanish historiography, see for example A. Alvarez-Ossorio et al. ed., La Perida de 
Europa (Madrid 2007); A. Alvarez-Ossorio et al. ed., La Monarquia de las naciones 
(Madrid 2004). With respect to the kingdom of France, where the various provinces 
were inalienable parts of that kingdom, rather then possessions of a given dynasty, 
the nature of government within them remained very varying and posed very 
different challenges to the crown.   




Having said that, we must not ignore that on the periphery of 
Europe there existed ancient kingdoms since the high Middle Ages, such as 
Portugal, England, Scotland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, all with a 
continuous territorial landmass, reasonable continuous borders with 
neighboring kingdoms, hardly any or rather no major independent 
jurisdiction of either church or high nobility within these borders (the 
palatinate of Durham in England remained rather an exception within this 
kingdom), a rather small higher aristocracy and strong legal resources of the 
king to punish offenders with a rather centralized court system. These 
characteristics do not allow us to address the realm of England itself, or the 
kingdoms of Portugal or Denmark or Sweden, as dynastic agglomerates, 
though each of these kingdoms became part of a larger dynastic 
agglomerate for a longer or shorter period. The others − the new monarchy 
in Spain, the Valois and Bourbons in France, the Habsburgs in Germany, 
the Stuarts and the House of Hanover in Britain, the Vasa in Poland − did 
run highly heterogeneous lands and had to confront a whole political 
cosmos of dynasties of the higher aristocracy in these various lands. 11 
Historians have thus shifted from addressing early modern kingdoms as 
composite states (Elliot) to composite monarchies (Bonney) to dynastic 
agglomerates (Morrill), each term emphasizing a bit more the sometimes 
haphazard manner of bringing lands together and the utter heterogeneity of 
law, culture and sociological makeup of the various parts.12  
 
 
Second: Finance  
 
Pace Charles Tilly, wars did not make states, let alone finance them.13 Wars 
cost money, indeed cost significantly more then monarchs could gather via 
demesne income or, where existing, reasonably regular taxes; what is more, 
once begun, wars enforced desperate politics of haphazard war financing. 
They forced monarchies into giving away resources − like selling or 
mortgaging offices, taxes, demesne lands − and getting into debt. Therefore, 
                                                     
11 See, for instance, J. Spengler, The Society of Princes (Aldershot 2009). 
12  See note above; their insights now begin to inform the textbook level: for 
example, N. Henshall, The Zenith of Absolute Monarchy and its Elites (Cambridge 2010). 
13  C. Tilly, ‘War and State Making as Organized Crime’ in: P. B. Evans, D. 
Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol ed., Bringing the State Back (Cambridge 1985) 169-191.  




after the experience of about a 150-year period of desperate financial 
measures and the catastrophe of the Fronde in 1648-1653 as a direct result 
of Crown bankruptcy, in 1661, at the onset of Louis XIV’s new war politics, 
his minister Colbert begged him not to engage in wars yet again. Did 
Colbert also ask Louis to remember the catastrophic consequences of the 
war against Spain (1635-1659), when bankruptcy in 1648 prompted a 
breakdown of royal power, the Fronde, a breakdown that Louis (born in 
1638) experienced as a small boy? Or did he not dare mention this disaster? 
In any case, Louis, now 23, would not listen and, pursuing the glory of 
himself and his dynastic house rather then any strategy of state-building, 
went on his adopted course. That had little to do with state building, or with 
consolidating long-term finances to make oneself independent from elites, 
but with very traditional princely ideas of status and glory. 14  Therefore, 
sociologists and historians increasingly begin to abandon Tilly in this 
respect.15 The assumption of the development of a bureaucratic coercive tax 
state during the sixteenth and seventeenth century has been gradually 
invalidated. The actual early modern innovation was public debt on a 
hitherto unknown scale. Whatever relevance taxes had gained by 1500 (as in 
France, England or Castile), the exploding costs of the European arms- and 
war race severely qualified their contribution to paying overall costs, hence 
the fact of exploding debt. Other innovations were the massive sale of 
offices and the farming of taxes. 16  Rather than experiencing the 
                                                     
14 For Colbert’s advice on war see H. Scott, ‘The Fiscal-Military State and 
International Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth Century’ in: C. Storrs ed., The 
Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-century Europe (Ashgate 2009) 23-53, in particular 23-
25; P. Sonnino, ‘Plusroyaliste que le pape. Louis XIV Religious Policy and his 
Guerre de Hollande’, in: D. Onnekink ed., War and Religion after Westphalia (Farnham 
2009) 17-24; for the issues of princely glory and prestige and the very important 
place of military victory for reputation at home see T. Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory 
(London 2007). 
15 On the problems of Tilly’s thesis and the sociological background to its success 
see P. Gorski, ‘How War did not make the State’ in: P. S. Gorski, The Protestant Ethic 
Revisited (Philadelphia 2011). 
16 R. Bonney ed., Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford 1995), in particular W. 
M. Omrod, ‘The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages’, 123-162, in 
particular 146-155; W. Schulze en Marjolein t’ Hart, ‘The Emergence and 
Consolidation of the Tax State’ in: R. Bonney ed., Economic Systems and State Finance 
(Oxford 1995) 261-280 and 281-294 respectively establish, as do the chapters on 
Spain (G. Muto) and France (R. Bonney) the continued importance of demesne 




emancipation of a bureaucratic state from its social and ecclesiastical elites, 
European monarchies became increasingly dependant on new power 
brokers and old and new elites to organize public debt, farm taxes and buy 
offices. While certain groups profited from these changes, others felt left 
behind. Debates and internal struggles ensued about this gradual 
reconfiguration of power, about access to offices and spoils, about the best 




Third: ‘Opinion’  
 
Contemporaries knew that there were tight limits to what could be coerced, 
and they reflected on the consequences of this fact. For example, in theses 
defended under Hermann Conring at Helmstedt University during the 
1640s to 1650s, a cautious reception of Machiavelli is very visible, and a 
major theme is the importance of ‘opinion’ among elites and subjects as a 
tangible, though difficult to measure, factor of power. Indeed, given the 
ongoing dependence on elites and subjects for rule, in particular for 
gathering resources to fight other princes, most princes made heavy use of 
pamphlets in order to influence opinion – for better or worse. It is clear that 
in particular the religious wars from the 1560s taught contemporary 
Europeans interested in politics that in several monarchies, certain issues of 
opinion had to be taken very seriously by any dynasty wishing to rule in the 
area, in particular religion. Whatever the dynastic legal title to rule by 
inheritance, monarchies had to submit in most cases to the confessional 
church and identity established in most countries during the later sixteenth 
                                                                                                                       
income, of the sale of offices, the farming of taxes and the overall establishment of 
a chronic and endemic state of indebtedness ‘solved’ with ad hoc and haphazard 
means. These problems occurred first for the main combatants, the Spanish 
Habsburgs and the Valois, but since the seventeenth century also for most other 
dynasties or republics with active foreign policy. S. Gunn, D. Grummitt en H. 
Cools concentrate on an earlier period, see their War, State, and Society in England and 
the Netherlands, 1477-1559 (Oxford 2008).     
17 See for instance R. Mandrou, L’Europe absolutiste. Raison et raison d’État (1649–1775) 
(Paris 1977); T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture. Old 
Regime Europe 1660-1789 (Oxford 2002); J. B. Collins, Classes, Estate and Order in 
Early Modern Brittany (Cambridge 1994). 




century. The need for Henry of Navarre to convert to the faith of Rome, 
the failure of Catholic Christine and then Sigismund Vasa to establish 
themselves in Sweden, the problems of the Catholic match for Charles I, 
the ultimate failure of James II in England and Scotland all tell a similar 
story. Dynastic title ultimately had to bow to confessional identity. But also 
the collapse of the French monarchy in 1648-1652, the British wars of 
religion (1642-1648) and the upheaval in many parts of the agglomerates of 
the Spanish Habsburgs – Catalonia, Naples − clearly persuaded 
contemporary commentators to take ‘opinion’ among both elites and people 
very serious.18   
None of this takes away the dense empirical evidence on at least two 
major structural changes in the outlook of European politics during the 
seventeenth century that have been admirably brought together in Heinz 
Schilling’s painstaking analysis of the relation of confessionalization and 
‘reason of state’.19 Firstly, by the second half of the seventeenth century the 
role and function of the three Christian confessions in foreign politics had 
changed and shifted. Though religious issues did not entirely cease to play a 
role in foreign policy and the relations among princes, 20  the kind of 
dramatic religious confrontations as during the French Wars of Religion, the 
British Wars of Religion or, to a degree, the Dutch Revolt, did not return. 
Religion remained an issue that could be partly used for mobilization – as in 
the 1757-1759 period when Britain and Prussia appeared to be united as 
Protestant powers against a Catholic League of France and Austria (and 
Orthodox Russia) – but clearly the direct relative weight of religion had 
decreased. Instead, most of Europe’s dynastic agglomerates had acquired a 
public religion that bound the agglomerate not only together but was seen 
by many of its inhabitants as a factor of considerable identity. Secondly, the 
number of players on Europe’s political scene had been massively reduced. 
Even major towns such as Danzig or German or Italian towns with some 
                                                     
18 A current application at NWO by David Onnekink suggests to seek further 
clarification about the place of ideology and opinion in European foreign politics.  
19  H. Schilling, Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen 1559-1660 (Paderborn 2007). 
With 673 pages, among them fifty three on used secondary literature, this book will 
for a long time be the standard to pull together the considerable amount of research 
done on this period and this problem. It will not be easily superseded for a long 
time. 
20 This topic is treated not least in D. Onnekink ed., in his War and Religion, but also 
in D. Onnekink and G. Rommelse ed., Ideology and Foreign policy (Ashgate 2011). 




independence up to the later fifteenth century had lost the capacity to 
entertain their own European diplomatic relations, as had most leagues or 
other associations of merchants or towns. Only a minority of princes, those 
at the helm of the major dynastic houses, remained as real players on the 
European scene. Also, the dynastic agglomerates received fairly continuous 
shape, though of course some – the Catholic monarchy – lost most of their 
European holdings outside the Spanish peninsula during the Spanish Wars 
of Succession, and further wars of succession emphasize the vital 
importance of dynasties and dynastic problems for eighteenth century 
Europe. Researchers such as Christine Roll, though not doubting the 
territorial consolidation of most dynastic agglomerates and the reduction of 
the international players to the major princely dynasties, thus do not find 




II    
 
At this point, the research project on the ‘New Monarchy’ and its critiques’, 
pursued with a grant from NWO and in close cooperation with Lucien Bely 
(Paris), John Morrill (Cambridge), Robert Frost (Aberdeen), James Collins 
(Georgetown), and Bernardo Garcia and Antonio Alvarez Ossorio (Madrid), 
seeks to clarify a specific point, i.e. the actual meaning of ‘reason of state’ in 
several seventeenth century tracts and in political discourse. It is based on 
the findings of the last fifty years, and thus takes the language of ‘state’ and 
‘reason of state’ not as a reflection of the – allegedly inevitable – rise of the 
modern state as institutional entity, but as part of a political rhetoric 
entertained against the background of specific problems of Europe’s major 
dynastic houses that were experiencing the intensification of warfare since 
the 1490s. Under pressure of competition with neighboring princes for 
power, influence and prestige, dynasties were not only forced to mobilize 
unprecedented resources and contend with the vagaries of religious change, 
they also had to deal with the increasing role of ‘opinion’ among those to be 
mobilized for support. In this context, the project argues, the language of 
reason of state did not mirror or signal an objective development of ‘state-
building’ (in terms of the coercive modern tax state as a legal person) but 
                                                     
21 C. Roll, Auswärtige Politik und politisches Weltbild. Zar und Kaiser in der europäischen 
Politik des 17. Jahrhunderts, Ms. (Konstanz 2003). 




one of the manifold attempts of contemporaries to both grasp the changing 
European scene and carve out a place for themselves in it. Monarchies 
differed from their late medieval predecessors by almost inevitable 
participation in the early modern war- and arms race and the subsequent 
requirement of huge budgets to pay for war; by the emergence of new 
groups with a vested interest in the survival of the regime as debtors and 
officeholders; and by significantly increased rhetoric addressing an ill-
defined public (not to be confused with a modern public sphere).22 The 
sources this project researches are analyses and polemics emerging in this 
new situation, in which the terminology of ‘reason of state’ is partly critically, 
partly affirmatively used.   
One example is the treatise L’Interest Des Princes et Estats De La 
Chrestiente by the Duc de Rohan (1579-1638). In this treatise, the Catholic 
Monarchy is – rightly – addressed as the ‘New Monarchy’, for it only 
emerged since the later fifteenth century. Rohan sought to find for himself 
as Protestant and prince a place in the emerging new arrangement between 
crown and aristocratic elites in France. An earlier favorite to Henry IV and 
main royal client in Brittany, the Protestant nobility had found service to the 
crown under the erstwhile Protestant Henry IV specifically beneficial. 
Protection of their faith, access to offices and resources by the grace of the 
king and living up to the reputation they demanded for themselves as 
defenders of France could all well be combined. The tumultuous history 
after the assassination of Henry IV, in particular over the reconstitution of 
(Catholic) church property from Huguenots in various regions led to 
eventual civil war and to Rohan leading Huguenot forces until their decisive 
defeat in 1629. Henri was accused of lukewarmness from within the 
fractured Huguenot camp and could neither entirely appease Protestant 
zealots nor the Royal court. He could neither find suitable military 
command in Venice nor gain suzerainty over Cyprus. Looking out for a 
prestigious post adequate to his social standing and aspirations, he was 
finally recruited by the French Crown for its wars against the Habsburgs.23 
                                                     
22 On the conference ‘The Transformation of Christian Europe: Princes, Dynastic 
Agglomerations and Fatherlands in Shaping European Society’, June 12-14 2008, 
and the conference ‘The New Monarchy’ 2011 (see www.erasmus.org). The term 
‘new monarchy’ was suggested in particular in conversation with Professor Paul 
Rahe.    
23 A. Laugel, Henry de Rohan : son rôle politique et militaire sous Louis XIII (1579-1638) 
(Paris 1889); Alden Clarke, Huguenot warrior: the life and times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-




Rohan’s career experienced in a nutshell the changing options of the French 
aristocracy from independent military leaders to government clients with 
access to significant financial resources. His leadership of the Protestant 
rebellion in 1627-1629 be seen against the background of his loss of his 
position as client in Brittany.24 Whatever his motives, while he stated that 
princes are governed by their interests (and not those of the modern ‘state’) 
he did, as Friedrich Meinecke rightly emphasized 90 years ago, combine his 
analysis of the interest of princes with a modern historical account of the 
nature of their dynastic agglomerates and the political constraint necessarily 





The analysis of treatises such as the one by Rohan seeks to understand both 
the factual legal construction of the dynastic agglomerate and the fact that 
dynasties had to secure compliance less by coercion but by persuasion, a 
persuasion based not least on their function as protectors of public order 
and property. This is the most important angle of this research project. The 
right to rule in early modern Europe remained in almost all cases (except, of 
course, republics) with dynasties who kept building their dynastic 
agglomerates by accumulating diverse lands. The House of Stuart eventually 
ruled Ireland, England and Scotland; the Madrid Habsburgs Castile, Aragon, 
the South- and Middle American areas, Milano, Naples and Sicily, and so 
forth. And in particular under the pressure of mobilization for war, the 
tensions between their dynastic aims and the interests of local and regional 
elites grew. Insofar, Trevor Roper had an important point. But at the same 
time, while around 1400 the average middling to great noblemen would 
mainly base his resources on fiefs and ecclesiastical benefices and offices, by 
the later seventeenth century princely offices in army and administration 
and financial investment in the fate of the ruling dynasty had become a 
major item in the resources of most elites. They had become entangled, for 
better or worse, with the fate of the ruling dynasty. The period characterized 
by this immense strife among princes and nobilities did thus not see ‘state-
                                                                                                                       
1638 (The Hague 1966); S. and P. Deyon, Henri de Rohan : huguenot de plume et d'épée, 
1579-1638 (Paris 2000).  
24 J. B. Collins, Classes, Estates and Order in Early Modern Brittany (Cambridge 1994) 
183-184. 




building’ in a modern sense, but rather an increasing involvement at least of 
elites with the fate of the ruling dynasty. In England and Scotland, for 
example, while most offices did hardly carry significant resources and were 
not for sale (as in the Catholic Monarchy or France), the acquisition of 
church lands in both kingdoms linked a considerable minority of 
landowners to the preservation of reformation settlements, however uneasy 
achieved. At the same time, Latin Europe held on to a strict distinction 
between legitimate public rule and tyranny, and debate about this distinction 
became embroiled in the conflicts over the raising of unprecedented 
resources for the conflicts of the period. The ‘New Monarchy’ engaged in 
this debate and sought to influence society, or at least elites, about the 
legitimacy of its endeavors, but it also invited criticism against the dynamics 
of war and office on which it seemed to flower.    
